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Abstract 
A central argument for the deregulation of employment contracts is that fixed-term contracts 
boost employment of job seekers with uncertain productivity by giving employers a tool to 
screen such applicants over a longer period of time before permanent hire. We test this 
proposition by comparing the risk of entering fixed-term employment for individually laid off 
workers with that for individuals who have left their previous job for other reasons. This 
strategy is based on the assumption that in the German context individual layoffs create 
uncertainty about job seekers’ productivity. We use data on work exits and subsequent labour 
market re-entry of the prime-age workforce in Germany from waves 2000-2013 of the Socio-
Economic Panel. Our results show that the risk of fixed-term employment is substantively 
smaller after voluntary job exits but reveal only a small and statistically insignificant risk 
difference between individual layoffs and workplace closures after adjusting for differences 
in socio-economic background and characteristics of the previous job. These findings 
challenge the view that employers use fixed-term contracts as an instrument to screen specific 
groups of workers whose productivity is highly uncertain, at least with regard to recent career 
disruptions. 
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Introduction 
This study investigates the allocation of previously employed job seekers to fixed-term 
contracts. Specifically, we compare the risk of entering temporary employment after different 
types of job exits to test if employers use fixed-term contracts to screen job seekers with 
uncertain productivity before employing them long-term. 
Since the 1980s there has been a noticeable expansion of fixed-term employment in 
many OECD countries usually justified as a measure to battle unemployment (e.g. Hipp, 
Bernhardt and Allmendinger, 2015; Kalleberg, 2000; Kalleberg, 2011; OECD, 2002).
1
 Fixed-
term contracts increase the flexibility of firms. For workers, however, temporary employment 
is linked with diminished job security and lower income levels. Previous research also found 
negative associations with welfare security, health, and psychological well-being 
(Emmenegger et al., 2012; Gash, Mertens and Gordo, 2007; Kalleberg, 2009; Kalleberg, 
2011; Mertens, Gash and McGinnity, 2007; Virtanen et al., 2005). Whereas there is no clear 
evidence regarding the ability of fixed-term employment to lower unemployment levels, the 
rise in fixed-term contracts came with increased inequality in the workforce (Barbieri, 2009; 
Barbieri and Cutuli, 2016; DiPrete et al., 2006; Emmenegger et al., 2012; Gebel and 
Giesecke, 2016; Giesecke and Groß, 2003). Exacerbating the issue, fixed-term contracts are 
found predominantly among typically disadvantaged groups, that is, recent entrants to the 
labour market, migrants, women, elderly and unskilled workers, or previously unemployed 
individuals (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000; Dieckhoff, 2011; Gebel and Giesecke, 2011; Gebel and 
Giesecke, 2016; Giesecke and Groß, 2003; OECD, 2002). The distribution of fixed-term 
contracts follows a stratification logic according to which bad jobs are assigned to presumably 
unproductive workers. Thus, the increased use of fixed-term employment might further 
                                                 
1 
We use the terms temporary and fixed-term interchangeably. Thus, our definition of 
temporary employment does not entail being employed by a temporary work agency (cf. 
Kalleberg, 2000).
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entrench existing stratification in the labour market with regard to job quality (Barbieri and 
Cutuli, 2016; Biegert, 2014; Emmenegger et al., 2012; Fervers and Schwander, 2015; Gash 
and McGinnity, 2007). 
Nevertheless, scholars and policy-makers alike have hailed fixed-term contracts as an 
opportunity to improve the labour market (re)integration of disadvantaged workers. Fixed-
term contracts may enable employers to screen newly hired employees for a prolonged period 
of time (Baranowska, Gebel and Kotowska, 2011; Faccini, 2014; Portugal and Varejão, 
2010). The possibility of learning in detail about match quality before making a decision 
about long-term employment might lead to employment for workers who otherwise would not 
have received a job offer at all. If fixed-term contracts are used to screen workers that signal 
uncertain productivity, the targeted allocation to fixed-term contracts might actually reduce 
existing labour market inequality in terms of employment rates.  
It is difficult to disentangle whether a worker is allocated a fixed-term contract 
because of a match between bad job and presumably unproductive worker or in order to 
screen a worker because of uncertain productivity. In the present article, we advance the 
literature by investigating whether employers use fixed-term contracts as a screening device 
for job seekers with uncertain productivity. Similar to Gibbons and Katz’ (1991) study on 
“Layoffs and Lemons”, we shift the focus to specific career disruptions (see also Brand, 2003; 
Gibbons and Katz, 1991; Grund, 1999; Mincer, 1986; Schmelzer, 2012). Specifically, we 
contrast the effect of different job-exit types on subsequently entering fixed-term 
employment. This provides leverage for disentangling the use of temporary jobs as a 
screening devise from mere productivity-to-job matches. In the context of German 
employment protection legislation, we stipulate that different types of job exits imply distinct 
levels of uncertainty for employers (Brand, 2006; Gibbons and Katz, 1991). If employers 
targeted fixed-term contracts at hires with uncertain productivity, this should be reflected in 
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differences in the likelihood of entering fixed-term employment after job-loss through 
individual layoff compared to other job exit types. 
For our analysis, we use data on work exits and subsequent re-entry to the labour 
market by German employees from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Germany is an ideal 
test case for the hypothesis that job exit types affect the likelihood of subsequent fixed-term 
employment. Strict employment protection in Germany makes fixed-term contracts 
particularly valuable to employers because firing unproductive workers is very costly 
(Canziani and Petrongolo, 2001; Fervers and Schwander, 2015). Moreover, the admissible 
reasons to justify individual layoffs render this job exit type particularly ambiguous as a 
productivity signal. We use inverse probability of treatment and censoring weighting, a semi-
parametric method for the estimation of causal effects, because it allows us to simultaneously 
address both selection into different job exit types and into subsequent reemployment. 
Background 
The allocation of fixed-term contracts 
Fixed-term contracts increase the operational flexibility of a company because they 
enable the reduction of labour regardless of employment protection for permanent contracts. 
It is thus in employers’ interest to maintain a steady stock of workers on fixed-term contracts 
who can be readily laid off when there is a need to adjust to economic downturns (Blanchard 
and Landier, 2002; Golden and Appelbaum, 1992). Because the use of fixed-term contracts is 
restricted by labour market regulation and employers have an interest to attract certain 
workers by offering better jobs, potential employees have to be selected into fixed-term 
contracts. 
There is ample evidence for social stratification in the distribution of fixed-term 
contracts. This distribution follows typical signals of individual productivity (Akerlof, 1976; 
Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973). In a variety of countries, temporary employment is 
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disproportionately found among labour market entrants, immigrants, the low educated (and in 
some cases the very high educated), and women (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000; Gebel, 2010; 
Gebel and Giesecke, 2011; Gebel and Giesecke, 2016; Giesecke and Groß, 2003; McGinnity, 
Mertens and Gundert, 2005). Additionally, the incidence of temporary employment varies 
according to previous employment record as well as occupation, sector, and firm size 
(Dieckhoff, 2011; Gebel, 2010; Giesecke and Groß, 2003). These findings imply that because 
temporary jobs are considered bad jobs with less security and lower pay, employers will offer 
them to workers who signal low productivity. Employers have no interest in tying less 
productive workers to their company. Therefore, they increase their ability to lay off these 
workers instead of those with higher productivity when the economic situation demands. This 
indicates that employers turn contract type into an aspect of overall job quality. As is the case 
with low wage or part-time jobs, bad jobs are matched to workers with low productivity. 
However, scholars regularly point out that temporary contracts differ from other bad 
or atypical jobs because of their fixed-term property. This property, they argue, enables 
circumvention of employment protection regulations, effectively rendering fixed-term 
contracts potential devices for screening workers after hire (Baranowska et al., 2011; Faccini, 
2014; Portugal and Varejão, 2010). Used as prolonged probation periods, temporary contracts 
enable employers to collect first-hand information on worker performance, thus lowering their 
risk of permanently hiring unproductive workers (Wang and Weiss, 1998). This explanation 
of the allocation of fixed-term contracts to workers emphasizes signals that induce uncertainty 
in addition to traditional signals of worker productivity (Akerlof, 1976; Akerlof, 1970; 
Spence, 1973). Employers might use fixed-term contracts to obtain a more complete picture 
of workers for whom the accuracy of traditional productivity indicators such as educational 
credentials or employment history is compromised. One implication is that fixed-term 
contracts may particularly benefit jobseekers with traits that signal a relatively high degree of 
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uncertainty regarding their productivity and who, without the possibility of fixed-term 
contracts, would struggle to find work.  
Although several studies discuss this screening hypothesis, they usually do not take 
the uncertainty dimension into account. Rather they either expect a need for screening for 
individuals with low productivity or interpret fixed-term employment as a screening phase 
when workers subsequently transition into permanent employment (Baranowska et al., 2011; 
Faccini, 2014; Portugal and Varejão, 2010). Despite delivering numerous insights about 
labour market processes, these studies cannot distinguish screening from mere productivity-
to-job matches, because the need to screen should only differ across groups of workers if they 
induce distinct levels of uncertainty about their productivity. If, for instance, an employee 
signals low productivity with a high certainty he/she might well be matched to a bad job – 
maybe a fixed-term contract – but there would be no need for extended screening. To 
distinguish screening from simple allocation of workers with low productivity to unattractive 
jobs, a framework is needed in which an additional signal casts doubt on the actual 
productivity of a worker and thus might lead to differences in otherwise comparable 
individuals. In the following, we propose a framework in which different types of job exits 
help us disentangle uncertain productivity from (presumed) low productivity. 
Layoffs, lemons, and fixed-term contracts in the German context  
The literature on scars of unemployment establishes job-loss as an event able to 
explain different career trajectories of otherwise comparable individuals (e.g. Arulampalam, 
2001; Brand, 2006; Brand, 2015; Gangl, 2004; Gangl, 2006; Ruhm, 1991). Within the setting 
of unemployment scarring, Gibbons and Katz (1991) use job exit types to test hypotheses 
about signalling effects on income. Referring to Akerlof’s (1970) famous study on used car 
markets, they propose that job exit type might provide a signal that helps employers sort out 
potential “lemons” (see also Brand, 2003; Brand, 2006). Specifically, they argue that layoffs 
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send a signal of lower productivity as they suggest slack performance or faulty work. By 
contrast, they suggest that future employers do not blame workers for losing their jobs in the 
case of workplace closure. 
 In the present study, we make use of the distinction between individual layoffs and 
workplace closure to test if employers use temporary jobs for screening in Germany. Due to 
the rather strict German employment protection legislation for permanent contracts, fixed-
term contracts are particularly valuable to employers as a tool to maintain flexibility and – 
potentially – to screen workers with uncertain productivity. Similar to most other OECD 
countries temporary employment increased notably in Germany (Eichhorst, Marx and Tobsch, 
2015; OECD, 2002; OECD, 2014). In 2011, fixed term contracts made up almost 15% of all 
German work contracts.
2
 Unlike in the US where the low degree of employment protection 
renders individual layoffs a signal for low productivity (Gibbons and Katz, 1991), individual 
layoffs are to some extent decoupled from productivity in the German context. After a trial 
period of usually six months, individual layoffs are permitted only for three reasons: 
misconduct (e.g., theft, frequent absenteeism, or slack work), indisposition (e.g., chronic 
illness, disability), and redundancy. In case of the latter, dismissals need to be socially 
tenable, judged on grounds of seniority, age, and family obligations of individual employees 
(Jahn, 2009). In addition, work councils are able to veto ambiguous layoffs and thereby can 
delay their enforcement. Because only some individual layoffs in Germany are therefore 
                                                 
2 
Legislation eased the use of fixed-term contracts steadily over the last 3 or so decades. Until 
1985, when short fixed-term contracts became generally available in an effort to battle 
widespread unemployment, temporary employment in Germany was an exception for 
specific, legally defined circumstances (e.g., replacements of workers on leave, temporary 
projects). Further legislation in 1996 and 1999 restricted fixed-term contracts to a maximum 
duration of two years for workers who had not been previously hired by the same employer, 
with the possibility of prolonging initially shorter contracts up to three times. Longer 
durations remained feasible only in justified situations such as temporally limited project 
work or academia. These regulations were relaxed again in the early 2000s Hartz reforms. For 
instance, For instance, newly established firms were allowed to use fixed-term contracts for 
up to 4 years without having to provide a valid reason.
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indicative of low productivity, this job exit type entails a high degree of uncertainty (see 
Figure 1). By contrast, the expected productivity distribution among workers who lost their 
job due to workplace closure should be less dispersed and more positive on average. 
Comparing two otherwise similar workers (in terms of their traditonal productivity signals), 
the signal of individual layoff should create doubt about the actual productivity in future 
employers.
3
 
Thus, our central hypothesis is: Individual layoffs increase the probability of 
subsequently entering fixed-term employment relative to workplace closures for otherwise 
comparable individuals. 
For a more complete perspective on the relationship between job exit type and 
allocation to temporary employment, we also looked at voluntary job exits by employees and 
two more ambiguous job exit types, namely, mutual termination of the job and contract 
expiry. Existing research shows that voluntary job exits are associated with better subsequent 
job quality, most likely because of already having better job prospects lined up at the time of 
exit (Mincer, 1986; Schmelzer, 2012). In line with that reasoning and under the assumption 
that temporary jobs are widely regarded as being unattractive, we expect that individuals who 
leave current employment voluntarily have a relatively high productivity and therefore a 
lower risk of entering temporary employment. In addition, other job exit types are more often 
associated with a subsequent period of unemployment further decreasing job prospects 
                                                 
3
 A growing literature discusses the role of labour market intermediaries in the 
matching process of jobs and workers (e.g. Autor, 2009). The increased importance of third 
party actors such as Public Employment Offices and temporary help agencies in so-called 
triadic relationships has not been matched by evidence on how they might moderate the 
matching process, however (Bills et al. 2017). In the present study, the efforts of actors to 
whom worker searches have been outsourced might help reduce uncertainty about worker 
productivity and thus mitigate adverse selection between workers who were laid off and those 
who lost their job due to workplace closure. On the other hand, intermediaries might 
anticipate employers’ preferences and minimize risk and thus exacerbate effects of 
uncertainty as has been shown for gendered hiring effects (Fernandez-Mateo and King, 2011). 
As we do not have information on the role of intermediaries in the job matching process, we 
have to defer to future studies to investigate these issues. 
  10 
relative to voluntary exits (Edin and Gustavsson, 2008). Similarly, mutual contract dissolution 
might indicate that an employee already has good job prospects. However, the employers' 
willingness to let an employee go might also signal low productivity or a bad fit. Along the 
same lines, the expiry of a contract sends mixed signals. On the one hand, it might indicate a 
less productive worker since the employer does not renew the contract. On the other hand, it 
might be the choice of the employee to let the contract run out and take a better job 
opportunity. The perceived necessity to screen these workers should thus be higher than 
workplace closures yet below layoffs. 
 
 Figure 1. Hypothesized productivity distributions for different job exit types 
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Method 
Data and sample 
Our empirical analyses are based on the SOEP v30 (Wagner, Frick and Schupp, 2007), 
an annual survey of representative German households carried out since 1984 by the SOEP 
Group located at the German Institute for Economic Research, Berlin. The vast majority of 
respondents completed personal paper and pencil or computer-assisted interviews with trained 
survey personnel, telephone interviews and mail-in questionnaires being an exception. 
Besides a host of socio-economic and demographic covariates, these data include information 
on working respondents’ contract type and the reason for job exits. 
Because consistent information on reasons for job exit is only available from 2001 
onwards, we used covariate information from waves 2000 to 2013. We focused on 
respondents aged 25 to 54 at the time of job exit who left their job following resignation, 
mutual contract termination, contract expiry, individual layoff, or workplace closure between 
2001 and 2010, yielding 4,965 job exits from 3,732 respondents. From this original sample, 
246 respondents (7%) and 351 job exits (7%) were dropped due to missing values on 
covariates. We used the remaining sample to analyse censoring, that is, not being observed in 
dependent employment and with valid information on contract type within the three waves 
following job exit. Finally, there were 3,307 uncensored job exits from 2,526 respondents, for 
which we could estimate the association between type of job exit and subsequent employment 
contract. Of these job exits, 1,415 were resignations, 334 were mutual terminations, 498 were 
contract expiries, 749 were individual layoffs, and 311 were workplace closures. 
Measures 
The main dependent variable of this study is an indicator for holding a fixed-term as 
opposed to a permanent employment contract in the first job following a job exit. This 
information was recorded annually through respondents’ self-reports. To determine the date 
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of reemployment, we used monthly activity calendars, with which we were able to match 
subsequent contract type to each job exit. We also generated a censoring indicator to record 
whether information on employment contract was unavailable, either because respondents had 
not re-entered dependent employment within three years after job exit or because contract 
type upon labour market re-entry was missing. 
 The main independent variable of this study is type of job exit, which we also derived 
from annual self-reports by respondents. We used a variable based on annual information 
regarding the reason of the most recent job exit in the year preceding an interview as well as 
the current calendar year up until the interview date. Respondents could choose, besides other 
types of job exit that we excluded from the present analyses, from the following categories: 
giving notice, mutual contract termination, contract expiry, individual layoff, and workplace 
closure.
4
 
 To model selection into the different job exits and being censored, we used a number 
of variables measured at the interview before job exit that capture respondents’ demographic 
background, self-rated health, household structure and resources, qualifications as well as 
characteristics of the previous job. Demographic background variables included age, sex, an 
indicator whether a respondent herself or any of her parents immigrated to Germany, and an 
indicator whether a respondent resided in a federal state belonging to West Germany as 
opposed to East Germany. Self-rated health was available on a five-point-scale, which we 
turned into an indicator for unsatisfactory or bad health. Marital status (‘single’, ‘married’, 
‘separated/divorced/widowed’), number of children in the household (‘one child’, ‘two 
children’, ‘three or more children’), and annual household income were used to measure 
household structure and resources. Measures for qualifications were indicators for education 
based on the International Standard Classification of Education (‘inadequate and elementary’, 
                                                 
4 
Excluded job exit types are retirement, maternity leave, and going out of business 
after self-employment. 
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‘intermediate or Abitur with vocational training’, ‘higher vocational’, ‘tertiary’) as well as 
years of experience in full-time and part-time employment. Measured characteristics of the 
previous job included duration of tenure, public sector vs. private sector employment, firm 
size (‘less than 20 employees’, ’20 to 100 employees’, 201 to 2000 employees’, ‘2001 and 
more employees’), occupation based on the two-level International Standard Classification of 
Occupations-88, and industry with both occupation and industry including a category for 
missing values. To adjust for aggregate conditions that may change over time and affect both 
job exit types and trends in temporary employment, we included indicators for the survey 
year.
5
 
Analytic strategy 
Estimating the effect of job exit type on entering temporary employment faces two key 
challenges: differences between job exits other than type of exit that affect entering temporary 
employment (i.e., confounding) and non-random selection into the sample with observed 
contract type (i.e., systematic censoring). For example, employees at an earlier career stage 
with little work experience may be more likely to be laid off and have a higher risk of 
entering temporary employment thus creating a spurious association between individual 
layoff and subsequent contract type. But a spurious association may also result if censoring 
(and thus observation of contract type) were related to job exit type and entering temporary 
employment (Elwert and Winship, 2014; Winship and Mare, 1992). This would be the case if 
job exit type affected the probability of being censored such that only the most productive 
individuals who were laid off would be observed with valid information on contract type (see 
Online Supplement for a graphical depiction of our causal model). 
                                                 
5 
We also run separate robustness checks for the period before 2007 and since in order 
to assess whether the reforms in the early 2000s or the economic crisis moderate our results 
(see Table S3 in the Online Supplement). We do not find substantive differences for the two 
time periods.
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We address these challenges by using inverse probability of treatment and censoring 
weighting (Hernán and Robins, 2006; Hernán and Robins, forthcoming). Instead of explicitly 
controlling for measured covariates to correct for confounding and non-random censoring, 
this technique regresses contract type after reemployment on type of job exit in a weighted 
pseudo-population in which job exit type is independent of covariates and censoring is 
independent of covariates and type of job exit. The treatment weight tw is formally defined as 
the ratio of the unconditional probability that a respondent i experiences the observed job exit 
type e and the same probability conditional on covariates Z measured before the job exit, 
  
𝑡𝑤𝑖 =
𝑃(𝐸𝑖=𝑒𝑖)
𝑃(𝐸𝑖=𝑒𝑖| 𝑍𝑖)
.      (1) 
 
Applying this weight creates a pseudo-population, in which respondents with covariate values 
overrepresented in the observed job exit type are given less weight, whereas respondents with 
less frequent covariate values receive a higher weight. After weighting, confounders are thus 
equally distributed among all types of job exit.  
 Reweighting with censoring weights, 
 
𝑐𝑤𝑖 =
𝑃(𝐶𝑖=0)
𝑃(𝐶𝑖=0|𝐸𝑖, 𝑍𝑖)
,      (2) 
 
corrects for non-random censoring based on job exit type and covariates measured before job 
exit. Equivalent to treatment weights, using the weights cwi creates a pseudo-population that 
would have been observed had censoring been random with regard to type of job exit and 
covariates. Using the product of both weights for reweighting the uncensored sample thus 
effectively corrects for confounding by the measured covariates and non-random censoring 
based on job exit type and measured covariates. Because all probabilities in Equations 1 and 2 
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are unknown, we estimated them using multinomial logistic regression and logistic 
regression, respectively (see Table S1 in the Online Supplement for the models estimating 
both denominators). 
 Under the assumptions of no unmeasured confounding and systematic censoring, 
positivity, and correct parametric specification of the weight models, simple risk differences 
in the weighted pseudo-populations yield consistent estimators for the average causal effect of 
job exit type on entering temporary employment. No unmeasured confounding and systematic 
censoring is a theoretical assumption that cannot be tested empirically. Its plausibility 
depends on whether the measured covariates include relevant confounders and determinants 
of censoring. Positivity demands a nonzero probability of each job exit type for any 
combination of covariate values to ensure a comparison of “like with like”. Violations of 
positivity as well as misspecifications of the weight models lead to estimated weights with 
mean values far from one or large standard deviations (Cole and Hernán, 2008). Table S2 in 
the Online Supplement shows that neither was the case for our weights. The above 
assumptions are the same assumptions as for conventional regression. An important 
advantage of inverse probability weighting is, however, that covariates are not included in the 
final outcome model. Therefore, misspecification bias through exclusion of interaction effects 
between covariates and job exit types can be avoided and the coefficients for job exit types 
directly correspond to average differences in the probability to enter temporary employment 
(and in the probability to be uncensored) (Morgan and Todd, 2008; Winship and Elwert, 
2010). 
Results 
We present our findings in three steps. First, we show mean differences in covariates 
by type of job exit. Second, we display how censored and uncensored job exits differ with 
regard to job exit type and covariates. Finally, we present the estimated differences between 
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job exit type in the probability of being uncensored and the probability of entering temporary 
employment. In both cases, we report unadjusted differences along with estimates after 
covariate adjustment through IPT weighting. For differences in entering temporary 
employment, we also adjust for systematic censoring based on job exit type and measured 
covariates. 
Covariate differences by job exit type and censoring status 
Table 1 depicts covariate differences by job exit type for the full analytic sample based 
on means for continuous variables and on percentages for categorical variables. Comparing 
individual layoffs to workplace closure, there are no large differences on these measured 
characteristics, with the exception that marriage is less frequent among the former. The 
contrast between individual layoffs and resignations is, as one would expect, much larger. 
Individuals who experienced layoff were more likely to be male, more often reported to be 
not in good health and to reside in East Germany, had lower education and household income, 
and less often worked in the public sector and larger firms than individuals who resigned 
voluntarily. In terms of education, household income, family status, and age, resignations 
were quite similar to mutual contract dissolutions. But the latter also had the highest 
percentage of individuals who reported being not in good health. Contract expiries were 
unique in their high percentage of public sector employment and being single as well as 
comparatively little work experience. 
 
Table 1. Means and percentages for covariates before job exit by type of job exit, full sample 
 Individual 
layoff 
Resignation Mutual 
termination 
Contract  
expiry 
Workplace  
closed 
Age 39.0 37.3 38.7 37.0 40.5 
Male 56.5 50.0 53.2 45.7 58.5 
Migration background 23.2 20.7 18.0 18.9 21.5 
Poor or bad health 13.1 8.8 15.0 9.8 10.8 
Family status      
 Married 54.2 54.7 56.6 41.5 66.8 
 Single 31.8 34.5 29.7 44.9 23.7 
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 Separated/divorced/widowed 14.0 10.8 13.8 13.6 9.5 
Number of children in HH      
 None 53.6 53.6 50.4 58.2 50.5 
 One 25.3 22.8 27.3 24.0 25.5 
 Two 15.8 17.5 18.9 13.9 19.8 
 Three or more 5.3 6.1 3.4 3.9 4.2 
Residence in West Germany 61.4 83.3 71.6 58.8 69.9 
Education      
 Inadequate and elementary 13.6 8.5 8.5 9.2 13.8 
 Middle and Abi vocational 65.7 57.0 52.5 53.1 65.5 
 Higher Vocational 7.4 9.4 10.6 6.2 7.3 
 Higher Education 13.3 25.2 28.4 31.5 13.4 
Full-time work experience 12.7 10.1 11.7 8.7 14.4 
Part-time work experience 1.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.1 
Tenure with employer 3.7 3.9 6.0 1.4 6.7 
Annual HH income in 1,000€  33.8 42.2 42.2 34.2 38.3 
Public sector employment 7.4 13.7 21.0 37.9 6.6 
Firm size       
 < 20 employees 45.0 34.1 28.6 24.9 39.8 
 20 – 200 employees 33.9 31.2 29.2 38.0 35.2 
 200 – 2000 employees 13.8 17.9 21.2 19.0 14.3 
 2000 + employees 7.3 16.8 21.0 18.1 10.8 
Occupation      
 Legisl./sen. officials/manag. 4.1 5.9 5.5 3.0 4.2 
 Professionals 6.9 16.6 21.4 29.4 9.9 
 Technicians 16.2 22.8 25.8 17.7 17.4 
 Clerks 11.0 11.4 12.7 8.8 12.7 
 Service & sales 12.5 13.9 10.0 8.6 10.8 
 Crafts/skilled agricult./fish. 28.1 15.0 11.0 15.6 25.3 
 Operators/elementary occ. 20.5 13.3 12.9 14.6 19.3 
 Unknown 0.7 1.2 0.6 2.4 0.4 
Industry      
 Agricult./forestry/fish. 3.0 0.8 1.3 2.6 0.2 
 Manufact./mining/constr. 41.6 28.0 28.2 22.0 46.4 
 Electricity/gas/water 0.2 0.6 1.3 0.9 0.2 
 Trade 16.6 17.1 10.4 7.7 18.9 
 Hotels/restaurants 3.9 4.4 3.0 3.4 3.7 
 Transport/communication 5.0 6.1 6.1 3.1 7.9 
 Finance/insurance 1.7 3.9 3.6 0.7 2.0 
 Real estate 11.4 13.0 12.1 9.7 9.0 
 Administration 0.9 1.5 4.9 8.2 1.5 
 Education 2.4 4.8 5.3 17.0 1.3 
 Health/social work 7.7 13.9 16.7 14.3 3.3 
 Other service 3.2 3.8 5.3 8.0 2.4 
 Unknown 2.4 1.9 1.9 2.6 3.1 
N (persons) 1,071 1,486 452 654 434 
N (job exits) 1,232 1,710 473 744 455 
Note. Statistics pertain to full sample including observations without valid information on subsequent contract 
type 
 
Turning to a comparison of those who were observed with valid information on 
contract type within three years after job exit and those who were not, Table 2 shows that 
individual layoffs were more frequent among the censored and that resignations were more 
frequent among the uncensored. The other job exit types were distributed much more equally. 
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Moreover, censored observations generally were more likely to report not being in good 
health, more likely to reside in East Germany, and had lower education than uncensored 
observations. They also were less likely to be a professional or to be a technician and more 
likely to have previously worked as an operator or in an elementary occupation 
 
Table 2. Means and percentages for covariates by censoring status 
 Uncensored Censored 
Job exit type   
 Individual layoff 22.6 37.0 
 Resignation 42.8 22.6 
 Mutual termination 10.1 10.6 
 Contract expiry 15.1 18.8 
 Workplace closed 9.4 11.0 
Age 37.6 39.4 
Male 52.9 50.2 
Migration background 19.8 23.6 
Poor or bad health 9.4 15.1 
Family status   
 Married 53.0 55.9 
 Single 35.8 29.2 
 Separated/divorced/widowed 11.2 15.0 
Number of children in HH   
 None 54.9 50.7 
 One 23.9 25.7 
 Two 16.8 17.0 
 Three or more 4.4 6.6 
Residence in West Germany 72.3 67.5 
Education   
 Inadequate and elementary 8.6 15.3 
 Middle and Abi vocational 58.4 60.7 
 Higher Vocational 8.6 7.3 
 Higher Education 24.4 16.6 
Full-time work experience 10.9 11.8 
Part-time work experience 2.0 2.2 
Tenure with employer 3.9 4.2 
Annual HH income in 1,000€  39.1 36.1 
Public sector employment 16.4 14.8 
Firm size    
 < 20 employees 33.9 39.6 
 20 – 200 employees 33.6 32.2 
 200 – 2000 employees 17.6 15.4 
 2000 + employees 14.9 12.8 
Occupation   
 Legisl./sen. officials/manag. 5.1 3.6 
 Professionals 17.3 12.5 
 Technicians 21.5 16.1 
 Clerks 10.9 11.8 
 Service & sales 11.6 12.9 
 Crafts/skilled agricult./fish. 18.3 21.5 
 Operators/elementary occ. 14.2 20.6 
 Unknown 1.1 1.1 
Industry   
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 Agricult./forestry/fish. 1.4 2.3 
 Manufact./mining/constr. 32.3 32.8 
 Electricity/gas/water 0.7 0.3 
 Trade 14.5 15.9 
 Hotels/restaurants 3.7 4.3 
 Transport/communication 5.6 5.4 
 Finance/insurance 2.7 2.2 
 Real estate 11.9 10.9 
 Administration 2.5 3.4 
 Education 6.4 4.5 
 Health/social work 12.0 10.4 
 Other service 4.0 5.1 
 Unknown 2.2 2.5 
N (persons) 2,526 1,254 
N (job exits) 3,307 1,307 
Note. Uncensored = observed with valid information on contract type within three years after job exit. 
 
Job exit type, censoring, and temporary employment 
Table 3 summarizes the results regarding differences in the probability to be 
uncensored and the risk to enter temporary employment after the different job exit types. The 
first line displays the respective risk after individual layoff, which serves as the reference to 
which the other job exit types are compared. These comparisons on the risk difference scale 
are shown in the subsequent four lines. Finally, Table 3 shows the results of testing whether 
the null hypothesis of equality between the different risk differences can be rejected, which 
provides information on statistically significant differences in the probability of being 
uncensored and the probability of entering temporary employment between all other job exit 
types. The first two columns show the results without taking into account differences on 
measured covariates. In Columns 3 to 4, the estimates were adjusted for measured covariate 
differences using IPT weighting. The final column reports the estimates for the risk of 
entering temporary employment that were additionally adjusted for differences in censoring 
based on job exit type and covariates. 
Beginning with the unadjusted estimates for being uncensored, Table 3 shows that for 
only roughly 61% of job exits through individual layoff valid information on contract type 
was observed within three years after job exit. For all other job exit types a significantly 
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higher probability of being uncensored was estimated, with by far the largest advantage found 
for resignations with 22 points. After resignations, the probability of being uncensored was 
also significantly higher than for all other job exit types. In contrast, there were no significant 
differences between workplace closure, mutual contract dissolution, and contract expiry. 
The risk of entering temporary employment after individual layoff was estimated at 
roughly 35% (conditional on being uncensored). While the risk difference for resignation was 
-10 points, there were no significant risk differences between individual layoff and workplace 
closure. At an estimated -1 point, the difference was also substantively small. After mutual 
contract termination and, particularly, contract expiry the risk of entering temporary 
employment was 6 points and 25 points higher relative to individual dismissal, respectively. 
To evaluate whether these observed risk differences were driven by existing 
heterogeneity between the job exit types on measured covariates and censoring we used 
inverse probability weighting. The results, however, remained virtually the same. Individual 
layoff still was associated with a sizably lower probability of being uncensored compared to 
all other job exit types except contract expiry. There was no penalty for individual layoff 
relative to workplace closure with regard to entering temporary employment upon re-entry to 
the labour market, the main focus of this analysis. Measured covariates, therefore can explain 
neither the similarity of workplace closures and individual layoffs in terms of entering 
temporary employment nor the large differences between individual layoffs and voluntary job 
exits. At first, the significantly higher likelihood to enter fixed-term employment after 
contract expiry seems striking. Yet, by definition, contract expiry can only occur at the end of 
a fixed-term contract. It is plausible to assume that what we observe are individuals who 
repeatedly enter temporary employment, perhaps due to their own preferences or specific 
careers such as academia. 
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In sum, our results do not conform to our main hypothesis that individual layoffs are 
associated with an increased risk of entering temporary employment compared to workplace 
closure. We find that job exit type is informative with regard to observing valid information 
on contract type within three years after job exit, a large part of which is based on prolonged 
time out of the labour market. Individuals who were laid off are notably less successful in 
finding employment in the observed period. Yet, conditional on being observed in 
employment within three years of job exit, they do not show a higher likelihood of fixed-term 
employment. Thus, the argument that employers target fixed-term contracts at job seekers 
with particularly uncertain productivity was not supported. 
 
Table 3. Estimated Differences in Probability to be Uncensored and to Enter Temporary Employment by 
Type of Job Exit  
 Unadjusted IPT-Weighted IPT&C- 
Weighted 
 Uncensored Temporary 
Employment 
Uncensored Temporary 
Employment 
Temporary 
Employment 
Reference probability      
 Individual layoff .608
***
 .348
***
 .619
***
 .375
***
 .378
***
 
 (.014) (.018) (.016) (.021) (.021) 
Risk differences      
 (1) Resignation .220
***
 -.103
***
 .188
***
 -.120
***
 -.119
***
 
 (.017) (.021) (.020) (.025) (.025) 
 (2) Mutual termination .098
***
 .059 .107
***
 .057 .055 
 (.025) (.033) (.029) (.039) (.040) 
 (3) Contract expiry .061
**
 .248
***
 .032 .171
***
 .171
***
 
 (.022) (.029) (.030) (.039) (.040) 
 (4) Workplace closure .076
**
 -.011 .084
**
 -.011 -.007 
 (.026) (.032) (.032) (.044) (.044) 
Test of equality of 
risk differences 
     
 (1) vs. (2) *** *** ** *** *** 
 (1) vs. (3) *** *** *** *** *** 
 (1) vs. (4) *** ** ** ** ** 
 (2) vs. (3) n.s. *** * * * 
 (2) vs. (4) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
 (3) vs. (4) n.s. *** n.s. *** ** 
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N (persons) 3,486 2,526 3,486 2,526 2,526 
N (job exits) 4,614 3,307 4,614 3,307 3,307 
Note. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Uncensored = observed with 
valid information on employment contract within three years after job exit.  
 
Discussion 
In this study, we tested the hypothesis that allocation into temporary employment is 
(in part) based on signals of uncertain productivity, because employers want to screen specific 
groups of workers, whose permanent hire would be too risky. Whereas the existing literature 
delivers clear evidence for a socially stratified distribution of contract types across typical 
signals of worker productivity, there are no tests of fixed-term contracts being used as a 
screening device to reduce uncertainty. We argued that comparing different types of job exits 
might proof more informative regarding the screening hypothesis because they imply distinct 
levels of uncertainty on top of traditional productivity signals. Differences between job exit 
types would provide a clearer indication of employers' willingness to use fixed-term contracts 
to screen workers with uncertain productivity and to avoid inadvertently employing "lemons" 
on permanent contracts. We compared the effect of individual layoff on entering temporary 
employment with the effects of workplace closure and other types of job exits using panel 
data on the German prime-age workforce (SOEP 2000-2013). In the context of the German 
employment protection legislation, we expected that individual layoffs induce a particularly 
high level of uncertainty and thus should increase the probability of fixed-term employment. 
To account for various sources of confounding and sample selection that may produce a 
spurious association between job exit type and subsequent employment contract, we used 
inverse probability of treatment and censoring weights in our models. Altogether, the study 
contributed to the literature by shedding light on the question whether employers use 
temporary contracts to screen risky hires by using job exit types to disentangle the allocation 
process of contracts types from mere job-to-skill matches. 
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Contrary to the seminal study by Gibbons and Katz (1991) but consistent with an 
earlier study on Germany regarding wage mobility after different types of work breaks 
(Grund, 1999), we found no meaningful differences between layoffs and workplace closure in 
the probability to enter temporary employment. Similar to Schmelzer (2012), we found that 
only voluntary resignation is advantageous with regard to avoiding fixed-term contracts. We 
found little to no evidence that the allocation of temporary contracts depends on the degree of 
uncertainty that marks workers’ productivity as indicated by their job exit type. Adjusting for 
measured covariates such as education, work experience, or prior occupation did not change 
this result, because, on average, differences on these characteristics were only minor between 
these two job exit types.
6
 Therefore, unmeasured characteristics such as personality may play 
an important role for individual layoffs. But although we cannot account for potential 
confounders like personality, the results suggest that, if at all, they only affect hiring 
decisions, not the type of contract as individual layoffs substantively lower the probability of 
being observed in employment (i.e., being uncensored) within three years after job exit but 
not with the type of contract. In other words, it seems like employers take layoff (or its 
unmeasured determinants like personality) into account for hiring but not for the decision 
about contract type. 
These results speak against the stipulation that employers use temporary employment 
as a tool to selectively screen workers with uncertain productivity. Our results do not exclude 
the possibility that employers use temporary contracts for screening workers on the job 
independent of uncertainty, eventually turning temporary contracts into stepping-stones to 
better and stable employment opportunities (although the existing evidence for the stepping-
stone function of fixed-term contracts is mixed, see e.g. Baranowska et al., 2011; Booth, 
Francesconi and Frank, 2002; de Graaf-Zijl, van den Berg and Heyma, 2011; Faccini, 2014; 
                                                 
6
 This may indicate that most of the individual layoffs are due to redundancy, which in the 
German context, is decoupled from productivity to some degree. 
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Gebel and Giesecke, 2016; Portugal and Varejão, 2010). Additionally, there might be other 
sources of uncertainty besides job exit type which prompt employers to offer workers fixed-
term contracts in order to screen them. For the case of job exit types, however, our findings 
challenge the view that employers target them at specific workers with relatively uncertain 
productivity. Therefore, the analysis raises doubt that the expansion of temporary 
employment has particularly improved the job prospects of individuals whose productivity is 
uncertain to employers, by giving them the opportunity for prolonged probation. As 
temporary employment is generally more likely after an involuntary job exit, our findings also 
indicate that employers allocate fixed-term contracts to applicants with lower bargaining 
power. In light of the existing evidence on the distribution of fixed-term contracts, this 
implies that employers might use them as a general insurance against hiring unproductive 
workers, perhaps in order to be flexible in economic downturns (Blanchard and Landier, 
2002; Golden and Appelbaum, 1992). In this perspective, the benefits for workers or job 
seekers are less clear-cut. Rather, our findings support the view that contract type is part of 
the overall quality of a position, and that temporary contracts (which are less desirable for a 
number of reasons) are offered to less productive workers. The increased use of fixed-term 
contracts might thus further entrench labour market inequality between social groups 
(Barbieri and Cutuli, 2016; Biegert, 2014; Emmenegger et al., 2012; Gash and McGinnity, 
2007). 
 Our analysis had a number of limitations, which might provide starting points for 
further empirical research. The similarity of workplace closure and individual layoff with 
regard to entering temporary employment may be caused by regional depressions in the level 
of job quality following the closure of large firms, thereby masking the true differences 
between laid off workers and those displaced by workplace closures. Further analyses may 
address this issue by regionally stratified estimation. Furthermore, workplace closure might 
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be foreseeable in some instances, which might lead to pre-emptive layoffs and mutual 
contract dissolutions, which might distort the signalling power of different job exits. There is 
also evidence for recall bias in the reporting of reasons for job exit (Song, 2007). Because the 
SOEP collects this information with a time lag of only 12 months, on average, we are 
confident that this is not a major issue for our analysis. In the context of German employment 
protection legislation, there is a six months probation period even for permanent contracts. In 
some cases, this period might be considered enough to screen workers with uncertain 
productivity. If so, however, the argument for increasing the use of fixed-term contracts to 
enable additional screening would be invalid. Finally, the analysis focuses on one specific 
form of career disruption that may signal uncertainty regarding productivity. Additional 
insights on the selective use of fixed-term contracts may be gained by extending the analysis 
to other factors such as health issues or incarceration, that are less dependent on the overall 
economic context.  
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Table S1. Summary of models for estimating denominators of treatment weight (multinomial logistic 
regression) and censoring weight (logistic regression) 
 Denominator  
treatment weight 
Denominator 
Censoring weight 
 Individual  
layoff 
Mutual 
termination 
Contract  
expiry 
Workplace 
closure 
 
Job exit type  
(Ref.: Individual layoff 
     
Resignation     -.972
***
 
     (.094) 
Mutual termination     -.321
**
 
     (.124) 
Contract expiry     -.116 
     (.113) 
Company closed     -.382
**
 
     (.124) 
Age .047 -.123 -.205
*
 .039 -.039 
 (.069) (.094) (.083) (.099) (.056) 
Age
2 
-.000 .002 .003
***
 .000 .001 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Migration background .304
**
 .013 .157 .146 .120 
 (.107) (.153) (.141) (.148) (.093) 
Occupation  
(Ref.: Legislators, senior 
officials and managers 
     
 Professionals -.308 .227 .328 .456 .124 
 (.241) (.274) (.283) (.345) (.210) 
 Technicians .010 .172 -.206 .340 -.039 
 (.216) (.253) (.291) (.304) (.195) 
 Clerks .183 .251 .069 .387 .178 
 (.234) (.279) (.315) (.325) (.203) 
 Service & sales .046 -.187 -.347 .019 .081 
 (.235) (.302) (.314) (.321) (.211) 
 Crafts/skilled 
 agriculture/fishing 
.228 -.509 .050 .195 .245 
 (.224) (.301) (.301) (.316) (.198) 
 Operators/Elementary .267 -.099 .012 .296 .356 
 (.227) (.291) (.297) (.314) (.197) 
 Unknown -.208 -.641 -.521 -.414 .130 
 (.495) (.666) (.519) (.718) (.405) 
Industry (Ref.: agricult./ 
forestry/fishing) 
     
 Manufacturing/mining
 /construction 
-.475 -.410 -1.115
**
 2.164
*
 -.228 
 (.365) (.530) (.399) (1.049) (.272) 
 Electricity/gas/water -1.779
*
 .132 -.807 .793 -.873 
 (.874) (.720) (.681) (1.500) (.535) 
 Trade -.816
*
 -.921 -1.610
***
 1.880 -.061 
 (.378) (.548) (.421) (1.057) (.283) 
 Hotels/restaurants -1.225
**
 -.654 -1.290
**
 1.597 -.059 
 (.425) (.621) (.468) (1.099) (.341) 
 Transp./communic. -1.092
**
 -.578 -1.948
***
 2.070 -.209 
 (.409) (.566) (.461) (1.075) (.299) 
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 Finance/insurance -1.195
**
 -.808 -2.681
***
 1.261 .032 
 (.449) (.598) (.648) (1.114) (.364) 
 Real estate -.852
*
 -.520 -1.391
***
 1.500 -.200 
 (.379) (.545) (.419) (1.067) (.291) 
 Administration -1.068
*
 .306 -.072 1.663 .092 
 (.512) (.615) (.474) (1.178) (.349) 
 Education -1.127
**
 -.504 -.296 .600 -.339 
 (.437) (.584) (.444) (1.143) (.323) 
 Health/social work -1.181
**
 -.306 -1.221
**
 .362 -.135 
 (.389) (.550) (.419) (1.081) (.296) 
 Other service -1.095
*
 -.136 -.631 1.156 -.008 
 (.429) (.579) (.432) (1.103) (.315) 
 Unknown -.845 -.353 -1.104
*
 2.144 -.126 
 (.450) (.640) (.492) (1.099) (.345) 
Public sector employee -.108 .110 .807
***
 .013 -.130 
 (.163) (.178) (.161) (.266) (.129) 
Family status  
(Ref.: Married) 
     
 Never-married -.017 -.175 .054 -.148 -.262 
 (.171) (.210) (.202) (.254) (.147) 
 Separated/divorced/ 
 widowed 
-.197 .294 .056 -.371 -.367
*
 
 (.177) (.221) (.216) (.256) (.145) 
Male -.231 .288 -.081 -.069 -.606
***
 
 (.185) (.225) (.233) (.247) (.157) 
Never-married x male .094 .063 .123 -.127 .503
**
 
 (.217) (.273) (.263) (.313) (.185) 
Separated/divorced/ 
widowed x male 
.485 -.048 .100 -.135 1.121
***
 
 (.278) (.358) (.349) (.393) (.224) 
Tenure with previous 
employer 
-.023 .039 -.348
***
 .063
**
 .021 
 (.020) (.024) (.034) (.024) (.016) 
(Tenure with previous 
employer)
2 
.001 .001 .008
***
 -.000 .000 
 (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) 
Education  
(Ref.: Inadequate and 
elementary) 
     
 Middle vocational and 
 Abitur with vocational 
-.391
**
 -.218 -.096 -.462
*
 -.386
***
 
 (.139) (.205) (.190) (.192) (.117) 
 Higher vocational -.658
***
 -.203 -.361 -.842
**
 -.455
**
 
 (.195) (.271) (.273) (.269) (.176) 
 Higher education -.751
***
 -.245 -.272 -1.028
***
 -.629
***
 
 (.184) (.246) (.240) (.272) (.163) 
Firm size  
(Ref.: < 20 employees) 
     
 20 – 199 employees -.160 -.017 .523*** -.115 -.155 
 (.097) (.143) (.129) (.134) (.085) 
 200 – 1999 employees -.324* .122 .485** -.471** -.134 
 (.127) (.171) (.160) (.179) (.109) 
 2000 + employees -.697
***
 .252 .596
***
 -.553
**
 -.044 
 (.151) (.168) (.171) (.196) (.119) 
Full-time work experience -.003 -.004 -.050 .040 -.052
**
 
 (.024) (.033) (.029) (.035) (.020) 
(Full-time work 
experience)
2 
-.000 -.000 .000 -.001 .001 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Part-time work experience -.037 .000 -.091
*
 -.053 -.030 
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 (.034) (.045) (.042) (.044) (.027) 
(Part-time work 
experience)
2 
-.001 -.001 .001 .003 .000 
 (.002) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.001) 
Number of children in 
household (Ref.: None) 
     
 One -.093 .428
*
 .212 .114 -.001 
 (.161) (.198) (.191) (.219) (.132) 
 Two .045 .119 .270 -.101 -.048 
 (.187) (.258) (.228) (.269) (.155) 
 Three or more -.379 -.471 -.220 -.714 .454 
 (.293) (.465) (.340) (.543) (.247) 
One child in household x 
male 
.103 -.383 -.267 -.206 .309 
 (.222) (.283) (.276) (.297) (.187) 
Two children in 
household x male 
-.205 .155 -.283 .237 .552
*
 
 (.260) (.338) (.334) (.342) (.218) 
Three or more children in 
household x male 
.481 .045 .198 .365 .294 
 (.386) (.625) (.496) (.649) (.320) 
Log(household income) -.452
***
 -.111 -.585
***
 -.327
*
 -.217
**
 
 (.084) (.113) (.113) (.129) (.074) 
Poor health .357
*
 .606
***
 .183 .065 .372
***
 
 (.139) (.162) (.173) (.186) (.104) 
Resides in West Germany -1.067
***
 -.719
***
 -1.154
***
 -.730
***
 -.093 
 (.103) (.138) (.124) (.143) (.086) 
Year of job exit  
(Ref.: 2001) 
     
 2002 .239 -.238 .248 .443
*
 .225 
 (.157) (.204) (.202) (.213) (.134) 
 2003 .741
***
 .089 .575
**
 .871
***
 .368
**
 
 (.161) (.201) (.202) (.214) (.136) 
 2004 .847
***
 .149 .806
***
 .851
***
 .322
*
 
 (.171) (.219) (.202) (.233) (.141) 
 2005 1.035
***
 .370 .917
***
 .987
***
 .281 
 (.174) (.216) (.218) (.240) (.144) 
 2006 .956
***
 .091 .838
***
 .672
*
 .107 
 (.189) (.254) (.246) (.261) (.165) 
 2007 .633
***
 -.288 .283 .187 -.407
*
 
 (.179) (.242) (.230) (.266) (.166) 
 2008 .301 -.142 .591
**
 .018 -.313
*
 
 (.177) (.215) (.208) (.258) (.155) 
 2009 .201 -.287 .539
**
 -.130 -.083 
 (.175) (.227) (.208) (.264) (.157) 
 2010 .766
***
 .138 .474 .812
**
 -.196 
 (.186) (.233) (.244) (.252) (.164) 
Intercept 1.395 2.069 6.073
***
 -3.229 1.072 
 (1.386) (1.882) (1.666) (2.208) (1.130) 
N (persons) 2,526 3,486 
N (job exits) 3,307 4,614 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table S2. Descriptive statistics for inverse probability weights 
  Percentiles  
 M sd 1st 25th 75th 99th 
Treatment weight (TW) 0.96 0.65 0.21 0.58 1.12 4.36 
Censoring weight (CW) 1.00 0.23 0.76 0.85 1.08 1.86 
TW x CW 0.95 0.70 0.21 0.54 1.12 3.93 
Note. Statistics pertain to uncensored sample. 
 
Table S3. Estimated Differences in Probability to be Uncensored and to Enter Temporary  
Employment by Type of Job Exit and Time Period (IPW Estimates) 
 2000–2006 2007–2013 
 Uncensored Temporary 
Employment 
Uncensored Temporary 
Employment 
Reference probability     
 Individual layoff .595
***
 .344
***
 .665
***
 .442
***
 
 (.020) (.025) (.027) (.037) 
Risk differences     
 (1) Resignation .175
***
 -.092
**
 .209
***
 -.172
***
 
 (.025) (.031) (.031) (.043) 
 (2) Mutual termination .092
*
 .047 .140
**
 .073 
 (.037) (.048) (.045) (.071) 
 (3) Contract expiry -.006 .163
**
 .102
*
 .177
**
 
 (.039) (.052) (.045) (.059) 
 (4) Workplace closure .087
*
 -.000 .079 -.019 
 (.039) (.051) (.056) (.082) 
N (persons) 2,509 1,722 1,384 1,070 
N (job exits) 3,016 2,067 1,598 1,240 
Note. 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Uncensored = observed with valid information on employment contract within three years after  
job exit. 
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Figure S1. Hypothesized causal relations between job exit type and contract type (in the first job after 
job exit) in population (a) and weighted pseudo-population (b) 
 
In order to eliminate spurious association between job exit type and contract type we need to 
adjust for the common causes (i.e., confounders) of both variables as captured by the set of 
covariates included in our analyses, such as education, occupation, and sex. Additional 
spurious association may result from the fact that in order to analyze the effect of interest 
implicitly condition on having observed the contract type within three years after job exit (i.e., 
uncensored observations). This variable may be a collider on a path between job exit type and 
contract type, conditioning on which induces spurious association between the two variables. 
 Inverse probability of treatment and censoring weighting creates a pseudo-population 
in which job exit type is independent of the (measured) confounders and observing the 
contract type is independent of job exit type and the (measured) confounders. In this pseudo-
population, the association between job exit type and contract type identifies the causal effect 
of interest under the assumption that there are no unmeasured common causes of job exit type 
and contract type (see Figure S1b). 
 
 
